Ciccio v. SmileDirectClub, LLC

Docket: 20-5833 

Opinion Date: June 25, 2021

Judge: McKEAGUE 

Areas of Law: Arbitration & Mediation

SmileDirect sells orthodontic implements online as an alternative to traditional orthodontists. Plaintiffs sued SmileDirect, alleging false advertising. SmileDirect and its customers had an arbitration agreement that excepted claims within the jurisdiction of Small Claims Court. The district court concluded that whether the claims fell within that exception was a gateway question of arbitrability and that the parties agreed to arbitrate such gateway questions. The consumer plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims. One consumer plaintiff, Johnson filed a demand for class-wide arbitration with the American Arbitration Association (AAA). An AAA administrator stated that AAA’s Healthcare Due Process Protocol and Healthcare Policy Statement applied, which require healthcare providers and their patients to sign an arbitration agreement after a dispute arises in certain cases unless a court order has compelled arbitration. Johnson declined to sign the post-dispute agreement and moved to rejoin this case. The district court held that Johnson satisfied his obligations under the arbitration agreement, concluding that the arbitration agreement did not cover the dispute. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Whether an arbitration agreement covers a dispute is a gateway question of arbitrability, and here the parties delegated such questions to an arbitrator. Under the agreement and the incorporated AAA rules, it was improper for an administrator to effectively answer that gateway question or to overlook it altogether by binding the parties to AAA’s views of sound policy.

Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools

Docket: 20-1076 

Opinion Date: June 25, 2021

Judge: Thapar 

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Education Law

When Perez (now 23) was nine, he emigrated from Mexico and started school in the Sturgis. Perez is deaf; the school assigned him a classroom aide who was not trained to work with deaf students and did not know sign language. Perez nonetheless appeared to progress academically. He was on the Honor Roll every semester. Months before graduation, the school informed the family that Perez did not qualify for a diploma—he was eligible for only a “certificate of completion.” Perez filed a complaint with the Michigan Department of Education, citing the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1412, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and Michigan disabilities laws. The ALJ dismissed the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims for lack of jurisdiction. Before a hearing on the IDEA claim, the parties settled. The school agreed to pay for Perez to attend the Michigan School for the Deaf, for any “post-secondary compensatory education,” for sign language instruction, and for the family’s attorney’s fees. Months later, Perez sued Sturgis Public Schools, with one ADA claim and one claim under Michigan law, alleging that the school discriminated against him by not providing the resources necessary for him to fully participate in class. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. Under the IDEA, the decision to settle means that Perez is barred from bringing a similar case against the school in court—even under a different federal law.

Barger v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America

Docket: 19-3852 

Opinion Date: June 25, 2021

Judge: Batchelder 

Areas of Law: Labor & Employment Law

Local 2, representing carpenters and workers in related industries, is a local affiliate of IKORCC, which is an affiliated regional union of UBC. Barger has been a Local 2 member of Local 2. In 2007-2015, he worked intermittently as a carpenter for SPI, whose client owned and operated the Zimmer Power Station. Barger worked at Zimmer in 2014-2015. After being laid off, Barger called Zimmer’s Maintenance Manager, Lind, asking for a job. When Lind rejected Barger’s request, Barger responded that “[SPI is] stealing money from you” by falsifying hours. Barger told Meier, an IKORCC business agent, that he had told Lind about SPI’s overbilling. Barger said that it was worth the harm to other union members “to get even with” SPI. Meier filed a charge with IKORCC against Barger for violating the UBC Constitution by “Causing Dissension,” and failing to use “every honorable means to procure employment for Brother and Sister Members.” IKORCC fined Barger $5,000; UBC vacated the fine. Meanwhile, ESS hired Barger as an independent contractor. ESS assigned Barger to work at Zimmer. When he arrived, he was denied entry. ESS subsequently stopped offering him assignments. Barger sued, alleging violations of his free speech rights under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. 411(a)(2). The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Sixth Circuit reversed in part. Barger’s speech is protected by LMRDA section 101(a)(2) under the form-content-context test; the content of Barger’s speech was of union concern. The defendants had not raised the right of a union to adapt and enforce reasonable rules.

Kentucky Retirement Systems v. Jefferson County Sheriff's Office

Docket: 2019-SC-0476-TG 

Opinion Date: June 17, 2021

Judge: John D. Minton, Jr. 

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

In this administrative appeal brought by the Kentucky Retirement Systems from the decision of the circuit court in two consolidated cases concerning application of Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.598 the Supreme Court held that the Retirement Systems improperly applied the statute to pay spikes to a certain extent. Section 61-598, commonly known as the pension spiking statute, identifies artificial increases in creditable compensation to public pension-member employees occurring in the last five years preceding retirement, effectively increasing the employee's retirement benefits. In both cases, the alleged spikes were partly due to a change in the Jefferson County Sheriff's office (JCSO) accounting method and partly due to the employees' accrual of overtime hours. The Retirement Systems assessed JCSO for payment increased actuarial costs attributable to the alleged pension spikes. The circuit court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) an isolated transition in JCSO's new accounting method did not amount to an increase in compensation; (2) the Retirement Systems properly assessed the increased actuarial costs to the extent it was caused by regular overtime work and was not the result of a bona fide promotion or career advancement; and (3) the circuit court erred in reversing the Retirement System's original assignment of the burden of proving a bona fide promotion.

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Commonwealth v. Hess

Dockets: 2019-SC-0130-DG, 2019-SC-0208-DG 

Opinion Date: June 17, 2021

Judge: Michelle M. Keller 

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals vacating the order of the trial court denying Ford Motor Company's motion for summary judgment, holding that neither the court of appeals nor this Court had appellate jurisdiction of this unauthorized interlocutory appeal. Plaintiff sued Ford and multiple other defendants, alleging that Ford was one of the parties responsible for causing his malignant mesothelioma. Just over two years after the suit was filed, Ford moved for summary judgment. The trial court denied the motion in a one-sentence handwritten order that contained no analysis or reasoning. The merits panel of the court of appeals vacated the trial court's order and remanded for the trial court to enter another order with a basis for its determination. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment below and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that the interlocutory order in this case did not meet the requirements of the collateral order doctrine, and therefore, the court of appeals and this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

Louisville/Jefferson County Metro Government v. Honorable Olu A. Stevens

Docket: 2020-SC-0091-MR 

Opinion Date: June 17, 2021

Judge: Per Curiam 

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure

The Supreme Court granted motions to dismiss this appeal from the court of appeals' denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus directing Jefferson Circuit Court Judge Olu A. Stevens to rule on a summary judgment motion, holding that the appeal must be dismissed as moot. During the pendency of this appeal, Judge Stevens issued an order granting summary judgment to Louisville Metro Government (LMG) and dismissing with prejudice all claims against it on the grounds of sovereign immunity. The judge rejected the claim of governmental immunity asserted by the other defendant, Parking Authority of River City, Inc. (PARC), based on multiple issues of material fact leading to the denial of its request for summary judgment. PARC, however, was cleared to seek an immediate interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal at hand, holding that because the request for a ruling on the summary judgment motion was issued, the need for a writ of mandamus no longer existed.

Jefferson County Sheriff's Office v. Kentucky Retirement Systems

Docket: 2019-SC-0315-DG 

Opinion Date: June 17, 2021

Judge: John D. Minton, Jr. 

Areas of Law: Government & Administrative Law, Labor & Employment Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court upholding that decision of the Retirement Systems's Administrative Review Board affirming the decision of the Kentucky Retirement Systems applying the Ky. Rev. Stat. 61.598, the pension-spiking statute, to assess actuarial costs to the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office (JCSO), holding that the Retirement Systems did not properly apply the spiking statute in this case. The Kentucky Retirement Systems assessed the costs because it found a JCSO employee took unpaid leave for two months, causing a temporary decrease in gross compensation in that year, but then returned to his earlier pay. The circuit court agreement with the Retirement Systems, finding that section 61.598 as applied was not arbitrary, and therefore, the circuit court was bound by the Board's decision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the plain language of section 61.598 does not direct the retirement System to determine changes in compensation over a five-year period; and (2) the burden of proving a bona fide promotion was properly placed on the employer.

Davis v. Blendex Co.

Docket: 2020-SC-0171-WC 

Opinion Date: June 17, 2021

Judge: Lambert 

Areas of Law: Insurance Law, Labor & Employment Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the holding of the Workers' Compensation Board that the Administrative Law Judge properly found that Plaintiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, holding that there was no error. Plaintiff received a workplace injury and filed a claim for benefits. Plaintiff never sought or received any temporary total disability benefits prior to the applicable statute of limitations expiring. The insurance adjuster for the employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier offered to settle Plaintiff's claim, but the parties never reached a settlement agreement. Plaintiff later filed an application for resolution of his claim, but the employer denied the claim on the grounds that it was time barred. The ALJ found that the claim was not timely under Ky. Rev. Stat. 342.185. The Board affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ALJ properly determined that equitable principles did not warrant the tolling of the statute of limitations.

Davis v. Progressive Direct Insurance Co.

Docket: 2020-SC-0168-DG 

Opinion Date: June 17, 2021

Judge: Vanmeter 

Areas of Law: Insurance Law, Personal Injury

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the court of appeals excluding from the definition of a "motor vehicle" or "trailer" a horse-drawn wagon for insurance coverage purposes, holding that the insurance policy was unambiguous and did not violate Plaintiff's reasonable expectations when she purchased her motorcycle coverage. While driving her motorcycle, Plaintiff encountered a horse-drawn buggy. The horse became spooked and jumped into oncoming traffic, gravely injuring Plaintiff when she collided with the horse. Plaintiff's motorcycle was insured by Progressive, and neither the driver of the buggy nor his father carried any form of insurance. Progressive denied Plaintiff's claim under the uninsured motorist provision of her motorcycle coverage on the grounds that a horse-drawn wagon was not covered under the policy. The circuit court granted Progressive's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the horse-drawn wagon did not qualify as a "motor vehicle" or "trailer of any type" under the policy terms. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's assertions on appeal were unsupported.

Benalcazar v. Genoa Township

Dockets: 20-4044, 20-3995 

Opinion Date: June 10, 2021

Judge: Jeffrey S. Sutton 

Areas of Law: Civil Procedure, Real Estate & Property Law, Zoning, Planning & Land Use

The Benalcazars purchased 43 acres in Genoa Township in 2001. The property sits at the northern end of the Township’s more developed areas and abuts the Hoover Reservoir. The parcel was zoned as Rural Residential; development would have required separate septic systems, clear-cutting, and multiple driveways. In 2018, the Benalcazars obtained rezoning of the property to a Planned Residential District, which permits higher density development. Township residents approved a referendum that prevented the amendment from taking effect, O.R.C. 519.12(H). The Benalcazars sued. In a settlement, the Township agreed to change the zoning designation; the Benalcazars agreed to reduce the proposed development from 64 homes to 56 homes, to provide more open space, and to increase the width of some lots. O.R.C. 505.07 provides “Notwithstanding . . . any vote of the electors on a petition for zoning referendum … a township may settle any court action by a consent decree or court-approved settlement agreement which may include an agreement to rezone.” The district court permitted objectors to intervene, dismissed the Benalcazars’ due process claims, but ruled that the Benalcazars stated a plausible equal protection claim, and approved the consent decree. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Benalcazars’ due process and equal protection claims are not “frivolous” but “arguable.” The district court had subject-matter jurisdiction and had the authority to approve a settlement. No other merits inquiry was required.